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The Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM) is an independent, non-profit 
research and policy institute, created in recognition of the pressing need for 
independent, in-depth analysis of the complex issues involved in promoting stability 
and prosperity in Macedonia and South Eastern Europe. CRPM consists of experts from 
the country, working as researchers in the organization, as well as external 
consultants in close contact with the organization. The CRPM team provides relevant 
and timely analyses anchored in political and economic realities in the following policy 
areas: 
 
a) Socio-economic Development of Municipalities;  
b) Macedonian Politics (pre and post election studies);  
c) Health Care (financing; quality assurance; rationalization of health services);  
d) Social Security (Pension Systems);  
e) Good governance (monitoring decentralization; sub national budget watch);  
f) Capacity building of NGOs in community based policy analysis; 
g) Youth policy;   
h) European Integration of Macedonia;  
i) Regulatory Impact Assessment 
 
The CRPM regularly organizes forums, roundtables, and debates that serve to the 
objective of offering to policy makers “just-in-time” policy recommendations that are 
product of comprehensive policy research, well argued and focused on Government 
actions on the policy issue subject to the CRPM’s research interest. The Organization 
aims at filling an important gap in the regional civil society environment, which lacks 
institutions directed at monitoring and critically viewing the policy-making process and 
its output from an informed and educated point of view, while at the same time 
offering a forum for discussion and publishing of works dealing with this subject 
matter. The standpoint from which it approaches certain issues is principled. The 
organization considers peace and stability as the first principles that should reign in 
the Balkan countries, and believes that the major political goal of Macedonia is the 
integration with the European Union. 
 
CRPM’s experienced and multidisciplinary team is committed to provide policy makers 
with relevant and timely analysis anchored in political and institutional realities. The 
practicality of the organization’s recommendations is guaranteed by its close attention 
to empirical research. CRPM’s think-tank’s research is undertaken in the field by 
analysts with experience in participatory research and knowledge of the local 
languages. (Albanian, Macedonian, Serbian) Focusing on local research, its policy 
recommendations will be equally directed at international and domestic political 
actors. Seeking to develop a common vocabulary, CRPM promotes discussion and 
debate among the policy community. CRPM's efforts depend on the contributions of 
governments, corporations and private individuals to fund its activities. 
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1) BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
 
 
a) The accused is declared guilty for inciting ethnic, racial, and religious hatred 
under Article 319 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code. 
 
b) What follows from the legal description of the criminal offense is that it can be 
committed, inter alia, in any other manner that brings about incitement of 
national, racial, and religious hatred, discord, and intolerance. 
 
c) The court based its decision precisely on this clause. 
 
i) “…From the circumstances so ascertained, it follows that through his actions, 
the accused actually undertook the elements of the criminal offense 
“instigating or inflaming ethnic, racial hatred, discord and intolerance” 
under Art. 319, Para. 1 of the Criminal Code…This criminal offence, inter 
alia, can be committed in any other manner, whenever the concrete deed 
incites religious hatred, discord or intolerance…”1 
 
ii) “The very legal description of the aforesaid criminal offence clearly points to 
the conclusion that it can be also committed in any other way, by undertaking 
other activities instigating or inflaming ethnic, racial hatred, discord, and 
intolerance. In this particular case, as for the acts described in the wording of 
the first instance verdict, ..., the Court of First Instance has found correctly 
that they are acts of committing of one of the other forms of committing of the 
criminal offence being charged to the defendant and for which the defendant 
has been pronounced to be guilty.”2 
 
d) The court’s opinion does not give an account on which those elements are, that is, 
what those other activities are and how they are to be undertaken nor does it 
specify what those other ways and forms of committing the crime are. 
 
 
2) THE CURRENT STATUS 
 
a) The existence of this criminal offense is deemed acceptable in the European 
democracies,3 because of the need to: 
 
                                                 
1 Decision of the Court of First Instance in Bitola, p. 18, [in Macedonian, author’s translation]; (Пресуда 
на Основниот Суд од Битола, стр. 18.) 
2 Decision of the Court of Appeals in Bitola, PA, no. 631/2004, p.4, [in English, POA’s translation]; 
(Пресуда на Апелациониот Суд во Битола КЖ. бр. 631/2004 со која се потврдува обвинителната 
пресуда на Основниот Суд од Битола по истиот случај, стр. 4.) 
3 In the United States, on the contrary, this criminal offense is not likely to pass the constitutional muster. 
Namely, according to the constitutional jurisprudence of this country, any ban on hate speech comes down 
to an unconstitutional discrimination of viewpoints. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, (1992). 
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i) prevent disorder and violence4 
 
ii) protect the rights and freedom of the others5 
 
Nevertheless, 
 
b) The “in any other manner” clause renders the criminal offence vague and 
contains elements of retroactivity. 
 
i) The clause “in any other manner” in Article 319 paragraph 1 of the Criminal 
Code stands for definition of the criminal offence of “incitement of ethnic, 
racial, and religious hatred, discord and intolerance” solely on the basis of 
behavioral consequences, which are never discernable before trial’s closing 
stages. 
 
ii) As such, it does not let a reasonable person anticipate which speech and/or 
conduct is prohibited. This, in turn, leads to legal uncertainty and may have a 
chilling effect on the citizens’ willingness to exercise their freedom of 
expression. 
 
iii) Such vagueness may trigger arbitrariness in the course of application of this 
legal provision. Arbitrariness in application, in turn, may be a ground for 
striking down the legal act or a part thereof, in accordance with the theory of 
severability.6 
 
c) The court failed to establish standards of interpretation of the clause, with the 
object of clarifying the criminal offence and lessening its ex post facto effects.  
 
i) It is acceptable to counteract the arbitrariness that stems out of a vaguely 
defined criminal offense through making the latter contingent on a high 
degree of guilt or injury or by introducing judicial standards of interpretation.7 
 
ii) However, the sole inference from the Vraniskovski case is that if а person 
publishes religious calendars and leaflets, attends bishops’ ordination and 
performs religious rites on private premises, with the intention of dismantling 
a given religious institution, then he/she actually undertakes the elements of 
the above-mentioned criminal offense. 
                                                 
4  Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2003).
5 Jersild v. Denmark, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1994); Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 
(1996); Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34 (1994).  Otherwise, both justifications are 
an integral part of Article 10 para. 2 of the European Convention, that is, the list of conditions and 
restrictions that rationalize limitation on freedom of expression, laid down in the same article. Furthermore,  
Article 17 of the European Convention stipulates that no person may invoke a convention right to engage in 
an act aiming at destruction other rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. See Council of Europe, 
Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
6 Ass'n Ekin v. France, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 35, 1127-28 (2002). 
7 Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1996).
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iii) The decision’s tenor and structure do not point to the conclusion that these 
statements and activities stand for a comprehensive judicial definition of the 
clause “in any other manner.” 
 
iv) In view of that, the criminal offense remains vague and with elements of 
retroactivity. 
 
 
3) RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
With a view to overcoming the actual state of affairs and avoiding prospective harmful 
consequences from the application of Article 319 Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code, the 
Centre for Research and Policy Making (CRPM) recommends the following measures: 
 
a) Define the criminal offence of “incitement of ethnic, racial, and religious hatred, 
discord, and intolerance” exclusively with reference to conduct proscribed in 
advance, not on the basis of behavioral consequences, ascertainable only 
afterwards, in the course of court’s proceedings. 
 
b) In the case of religious hatred, define conduct proscribed in advance with 
reference to a personal injury, not affronts to religious doctrine. 
 
i) The opposite may entangle the courts into debate on insults to religious 
principles they are unfamiliar with. 
 
c) Permit defense on the basis of negligence, scienter, i.e., lack of awareness that: 
 
i) Somebody outside may have heard the speech of the accused and/or 
 
ii) His/her speech and conduct may have been capable of instigating ethnic, 
racial, and religious hatred, discord, or intolerance.8  
 
d) Enable the genuine political criticism to remain protected speech, even when it 
contains a component of religious slander.  
 
i) One should be mindful of the fact that the above-mentioned criminal offence 
may easily turn into a tool for suffocating the political debate.9 
 
Or, 
 
e) Establish judicial standards of interpretation of the “in any other way” clause. To 
this end, CRPM suggests three possibilities: 
                                                 
8 Public Order Act of England, 1986, c. 64, pt. III, § 18(2)-(5).
9 Ceylan v. Turkey, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 73, 87 (2000).
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i) Clear and present danger 
 
(1) The “in any other way” clause should refer only to the cases where the 
speech and conduct of the accused aim at inducing immediate violence 
that cannot be prevented by the law enforcement organs and store in 
themselves a real potential of bringing about such an unlawful situation.10 
 
ii) Gravity of evil 
 
(1) Set the judicial scrutiny of the ways that cause ethnic, racial and religious 
hatred within the inquiry into whether the magnitude of evil that may rise 
from the speech and conduct of the accused, discounted by its 
(im)probability of occurrence, justifies curtailment of the freedoms of the 
accused.11 
 
(a) The “in any other way” clause should refer only to the instances where 
the product of the evil’s magnitude and probability of occurrence is so 
sufficiently high as to ordain curtailment of the free speech and 
conduct of the accused and his sentencing, proportionally and to the 
extent necessary for restoring the original state of affairs. 
 
iii) Balancing (between the freedom of expression of the accused and the freedom 
of religious belief of the others) 
 
(1) The “in any other way” clause should cover the cases where the court 
determines that the accused consciously uttered: 
 
(a) False statements of facts; 
 
(b) True statements of facts on matters that penetrate the personal sphere 
of the concerned citizens; 
 
(c) Opinion that denotes a serious affront to the dignity of the concerned. 
 
(2) On the contrary, where it determines that the accused consciously uttered: 
 
(a) False statements of facts, but only after he/she invested efforts to 
verify the factual situation; 
 
(b) True statements of facts on matters that, beside the personal sphere of 
the concerned, implicate public life; 
 
                                                 
10 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969). 
11 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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(c) Opinion that inflicts only a slight damage to the reputation of the 
concerned;12 
 
the court, before resolving whether to subsume a given instance under the 
“in any other way” clause, should engage into balancing between the freedom of 
expression of the accused and the freedom of religious belief of the others. 
 
 
                                                 
12 This is actually a summary assessment of the German Constitutional Court’s treatment of free speech 
claims. See Lueth, (BverfGE 7, 198 (1958)), Holocaust Denial, (90 BVerfGE 241 (1994)); Historical 
Fabrication, (90 BVerfGE 1 (1994)), Tucholsky I and II, (21 EuGRZ 463-65 (1994)).
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